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On 5 October 2016, the High Court handed down its decision on Prince Alfred College Incorporated v 
ADC.1 The court had to determine whether an extension of the limitation period should be granted 
as provided by s 48 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA). In the judgment the court considered 
not only the principles relevant for granting an extension, but also the divergent views as to the 
approach to vicarious liability for intentional acts. Two judgements were delivered, a joint judgment 
of French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ (referred to as the main judgment), and a joint 
judgment of Gageler and Gordon JJ (referred to as the second judgment). Interestingly, the decision 
includes what the main judgment describe as ‘the relevant approach’2 to vicarious liability 
 
Decisions of the lower courts 
In Prince Alfred College Incorporated v ADC, the High Court had to consider whether the Full Court of 
the South Australian Supreme Court wrongfully extended the time under s 48 of the Limitation of 
Actions Act 1936 (SA). Briefly, the facts of the case were that the respondent alleged that the Prince 
Alfred College had breached its non-delegable duty of care owed to the respondent, and it was 
vicariously liable for the abuse committed against him by its employee, Bain, a headmaster of the 
boarding school. To proceed with his case the respondent required an extension of time as the 
abuse took place when the respondent was 12 years old and the relevant limitation period therefore 
had expired three years after he attained the age of 18 years, on 17 July 1973.3   
At first instance, Vanstone J determined that applying the decision of New South Wales v Lepore; 
Samin v Queensland Rich v Queensland4 led to the conclusion that the non-delegable duty of the 
appellant did not extend to protecting the respondent against intentional criminal conduct of Bain 
unless the appellant was at fault. It was held the respondent’s argument that the appellant was in 
breach of its duty was not established.5 As to the vicarious liability, Vanstone J held that the abuse 
was not connected to the role of the headmaster and could not be characterised as an unauthorised 
mode of performing an authorised act, nor was it ‘in any sense within the course of Bain’s 
employment’.6 This conclusion was made despite the fact that the evidence was insufficient to 
enable her to determine the nature of Bain’s designated role.  In respect of the extension of the 
limitation period, Her Honour denied the application, based upon the finding that the effluxion of 
time was so great that the appellant would have been prejudiced in attempting to defend against 
the claims.7 
In the High Court, the main judgment pointed out that this approach was not the correct approach in 
such cases.  Their Honours stated:8 
The question whether an extension of time is to be granted is one necessarily antecedent to 
the determination of any issue in the proceedings relating to liability to which the extension 
is relevant. Moreover, in a case of this kind – where there had been a very long delay in 
commencing proceedings and the defendant had raised questions of prejudice arising from 
its inability to obtain evidence – it was essential that those matters, as relevant to the 
question of extension, be first considered. It is the consideration of those matters which will 
point to the appropriateness or otherwise of determining any remaining issue in the action 
where an extension is not to be granted. 
It was noted that it was inappropriate for the primary judge to make a determination as to the 
question of liability when it was found that an extension should not be granted.9 Further, it appears 
that the members of the High Court found the primary judge’s ability to come to a conclusion as to 
liability when there was an admitted dearth of evidence was not appropriate.10 
On appeal, each member of the Full Court found that the appellant was vicariously liable for the 
conduct of Bain, with Gray J also holding that the appellant had breached its duty even though ‘the 
primary judge had pointed to a dearth of evidence’11 as to the matters relevant to breach. The court 
held that an extension of time to bring the proceedings should be granted.  Kourakis CJ was of the 
opinion that the lapse of time ‘could sufficiently be addressed by taking a conservative approach to 
the assessment of damages rather than by denying [the respondent] any redress at all’.12  Gray J held 
that the delay in commencing proceedings was the result of the appellant’s conduct and that it was 
just to grant the extension due to the nature and extent of the harm suffered.13 
 
High Court discussion on vicarious liability 
The important and well-known cases on vicarious liability that examine whether an intentional tort is 
within the course of employment from the United Kingdom,14 Canada15 and Australia16 are 
examined. The main judgement then comes to the conclusion that ‘the fact that the wrongful act is a 
criminal offence does not preclude the possibility of vicarious liability’.17 The relevant approach in 
cases of this kind is then explained:18 
Consequently, in cases of this kind, the relevant approach is to consider any special role that 
the employer has assigned to the employee and the position in which the employee is 
thereby placed vis-à-vis the victim. In determining whether the apparent performance of 
such a role may be said to give the “occasion” for the wrongful act, particular features may 
be taken into account. They include authority, power, trust, control and the ability to 
achieve intimacy with the victim. The latter feature may be especially important. Where, in 
such circumstances, the employee takes advantage of his or her position with respect to the 
victim, that may suffice to determine that the wrongful act should be regarded as 
committed in the course or scope of employment and as such render the employer 
vicariously liable. 
That approach may be tested against the Canadian cases earlier referred to and against 
Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd and Mohamud. It is consistent with the process of reasoning in the 
more recent Canadian cases in emphasising that, although it is not enough to found 
vicarious liability that employment provides an opportunity for the commission of a 
wrongful act, in cases of this kind, factors such as authority, power, trust, control and 
intimacy may prove critical. It is consistent in result with Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd, although 
different in process of reasoning, for it is apparent that the role assigned to the warden in 
that case placed him in such a position of power, authority and control vis-à-vis the victims 
as to provide not just the opportunity but also the occasion for the wrongful acts which were 
committed. 
This approach was endorsed by the other two members of the court, Gageler and Gordon JJ:19 
We accept that the approach described in the other reasons as the “relevant approach” will 
now be applied in Australia. That general approach does not adopt or endorse the generally 
applicable “tests” for vicarious liability for intentional wrongdoing developed in the United 
Kingdom or Canada (or the policy underlying those tests), although it does draw heavily on 
various factors identified in cases involving child sexual abuse in those jurisdictions. 
The “relevant approach” described in the other reasons is necessarily general. It does not 
and cannot prescribe an absolute rule. Applications of the approach must and will develop 
case by case. Some plaintiffs will win. Some plaintiffs will lose. The criteria that will mark 
those cases in which an employer is liable or where there is no liability must and will develop 
in accordance with ordinary common law methods. The Court cannot and does not mark out 
the exact boundaries of any principle of vicarious liability in this case. 
Therefore the appropriate enquiry in the case before the High Court was ‘whether Bain's role as 
housemaster placed him in a position of power and intimacy vis-à-vis the respondent, such that 
Bain's apparent performance of his role as housemaster gave the occasion for the wrongful acts, and 
that because he misused or took advantage of his position, the wrongful acts could be regarded as 
having been committed in the course or scope of his employment’.20 The factual evidence required 
to determine this issue influenced the High Court’s decision as to whether an extension of the 
limitation period was possible as it raised the question of whether the appellant could have a fair 
trial.21  
 
Extension of time 
All seven members of the High Court held that the circumstances of this case did not allow for an 
extension of time. Section 48 of the Limitations Act 1936 (SA) allows a court to grant an extension of 
time is facts material to the plaintiff’s case were not ascertained until after the expiration of the 
limitation period and proceedings are instituted within 12 months after the facts are ascertained. It 
is for the plaintiff to prove to the court that it is just in all the circumstances for an extension to be 
granted and that the defendant would not be significantly prejudiced.22 
The respondent in this case suffered symptoms of a psychological injury from the abuse he suffered 
at the school which intensified over time. Legal advice was sought in 1996 and 1997 where the need 
to apply for an extension of time was discussed, the advice being that there was a risk an extension 
would not be granted. In light of the unlikely chances of success of a claim against the appellant and 
the cost of litigation, the respondent decided not to commence proceedings. In 1997, the 
respondent advised the appellant that he would not take action and accepted its offer to pay 
medical and legal fees to that point and payment of his son’s school fees for three years. The 
respondent’s condition grew worse and by 2004 he stopped working and his marriage was 
deteriorating.  He made requests for further support from the appellant, but no further offers were 
made and in December 2008 he commenced proceedings. 
By the time of the commencement of proceedings a number of key witnesses had died and 
evidence, such as the notes of the respondent’s first psychologist, had been lost. The appellant 
sought to argue that the respondent’s injuries were not a consequence of Bain’s abuse based upon 
evidence of a referral to the psychologist from the respondent’s doctor which referred to financial 
pressures and abuse of alcohol. The fact that the notes of the psychologist had been destroyed 
significantly prejudiced the appellant’s case.23 
The High Court held that the dearth of evidence as to Bain’s role, vital for a determination of liability 
based on vicarious liability, had not been correctly taken into account by the Full Court. It was 
noted:24 
It could not be assumed that the position in which Bain was placed by his assigned role 
provided the “occasion” for the offending. The evidence on the respondent's case was that 
no other housemaster was present in dormitories after lights out and that the prefects were 
given the role of supervising the boys after that time. This raised a real question about what 
the role of housemaster entailed, a question which could not fairly be answered given the 
loss of relevant evidence. 
The members of the court of the main judgment noted that the respondent had accepted payment 
from the appellant and stated that he was not taking action. The main judgment stated that it was 
‘an error of principle not to regard the arrangements made by the respondent with the school as 
significant’.25 Particularly relevant was that the appellant had not negotiated any release from the 
respondent, demonstrating an understanding that the issue was at an end, and that there was no 
reluctance on the part of the respondent to commence legal proceedings that could explain the 
delay as he commenced an action against Bain in 1997. The prejudice along with the length of delay 
did not allow an extension of time.  In contrast, the second judgment treated the issue of an 
extension of time quite simply – the respondent had made a deliberate decision not to bring 
proceedings in 1997 and after 11 years changed his mind – therefore it was wrong for the Full Court 
to have extended time under s 48(3) of the Limitation Act 1936 (SA).26 
 
Royal Commission Recommendation on removal of limitation period 
With the release of the report by the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual 
Abuse in 2015, much attention has been paid to the recommendation for the removal of limitation 
periods for claims for damages founded upon personal injury resulting from sexual abuse in an 
institutional context when the plaintiff was child.27  
At the time of the report, Victoria had passed the Limitations of Action Amendment (Child Abuse) Act 
2015 (Vic) that amended the principal Act by removing the limitation period for bringing claims for 
personal injury resulting from child abuse.28 Since then New South Wales legislation has been 
amended, as has the Australian Capital Territory law. Section 6A of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) 
now provides that that an action for damages for death or personal injury resulting from an act or 
omission that constitutes child abuse is not subject to any limitation period. The amendment in the 
Australian Capital Territory is not as expansive, only removing the limitation period for personal 
injury resulting from institutional sexual child abuse.29 
Bills have also been introduced in Western Australia30 and Queensland.31  In the remaining 
jurisdictions there has been no legislative action yet.  The Tasmanian Government has previously 
indicated that it opposes the removal of limitation periods as there must be ‘a careful balance 
between access to justice for the plaintiff, fair treatment for the defendant, and freer and more 
certain daily commerce for society’.32 The Northern Territory Government advised the Royal 
Commission that in its opinion if the statutory limitation period was to be extended, ‘it should 
uniformly extended across all jurisdictions’ and that the appropriate position is that ‘a limitation 
defence is properly available where the institution has suffered real prejudice in its ability to defend 
the claim by reason on effluxion of time’.33 In South Australia it appears as if the availability of the 
scheme that allows ex gratia compensation to survivors of abuse is seen as the better way to resolve 
the issue and has the benefits of avoiding litigation and the associated trauma. 
 
Conclusion 
The decision of Prince Alfred College Incorporated v ADC highlights that an extension of time is 
discretionary but must take into account the purpose of limitation periods. It is accepted that as 
time passes the quality of justice deteriorates.34 A court should not grant an extension lightly, no 
matter how deserving the plaintiff may be, and a court needs to be wary of making assumptions. For 
example, Kourakis CJ of the Full Court’s opinion that the appellant should done more to anticipate 
future litigation and protect itself may be understandable, but fails to take into account that on the 
facts it was reasonable for the appellant to believe that the dispute had been settled.35 
The Royal Commission when considering limitation periods acknowledged that there are benefits to 
all parties if civil proceedings are dealt with as close as possible to when the damage is suffered. 
However, it was satisfied that the limitation period for personal injury arising from child sexual abuse 
should be removed and be retrospective.36 It is reassuring to see that many states and territories are 
moving in the right direction and removing the limitation period as recommended by the Royal 
Commission, and are in fact going further by not restricting it to sexual abuse in an institutional 
context. 
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